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Abstract
Background:  Commentary on health policy reform in Australia often commences with an
unstated logical error: Australians' health is good, therefore the Australian Health System is good.
This possibly explains the disconnect between the options discussed, the areas needing reform and
the generally self-congratulatory tone of the discussion: a good system needs (relatively) minor
improvement.
Results: This paper comments on some issues of particular concern to Australian health policy
makers and some areas needing urgent reform. The two sets of issues do not overlap. It is
suggested that there are two fundamental reasons for this. The first is the failure to develop
governance structures which promote the identification and resolution of problems according to
their importance. The second and related failure is the failure to equip the health services industry
with satisfactory navigation equipment - independent research capacity, independent reporting and
evaluation - on a scale commensurate with the needs of the country's largest industry. These two
failures together deprive the health system - as a system - of the chief driver of progress in every
successful industry in the 20th Century.
Conclusion:  Concluding comment is made on the National Health and Hospitals Reform
Commission (NHHRC). This continued the tradition of largely evidence free argument and
decision making. It failed to identify and properly analyse major system failures, the reasons for
them and the form of governance which would maximise the likelihood of future error leaning. The
NHHRC itself failed to error learn from past policy failures, a key lesson from which is that a major
- and possibly the major - obstacle to reform, is government itself. The Commission virtually
ignored the issue of governance. The endorsement of a monopolised system, driven by benevolent
managers will miss the major lesson of history which is illustrated by Australia's own failures.
Background
Concerns which have dominated national debate and
government attention have commonly reflected vested
interests and ideologies rather than the evidence-based
magnitude of problems. The different interest groups
include, as they have always done, the medical profession,
private health insurance (PHI), private hospitals, increas-
ingly, the pharmaceutical industry, the public health
lobby and 'government economic rationalists'.
One ideology concerns the unsubstantiated superiority of
varying levels of private ownership, control and financing
in the health sector. Another ideological belief is that
health spending should be dedicated only to health max-
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imisation (ignoring some notions of freedom and fair-
ness). Then there is the ideology of many government
departments - especially those heavily influenced by econ-
omists - that small government is an end in itself and that
minimum resource cost per unit of measured output is
always desirable. In the health sector this latter ideology
does not reflect population values [1].
In contrast with these views, there is a strong argument for
public spending to be based upon evidence, including evi-
dence relating to public values. This, of course, requires
information, but currently much of the information
needed to achieve this apparently obvious goal does not
exist, that is, the health system is being steered without
satisfactory navigation equipment.
In the present paper I initially comment upon three of the
prominent issues in the health debate, each of which is
associated with a powerful constituency namely, private
health insurance (PHI), ageing and hospital queues. Pri-
vatisation could be added as a fourth. The theme of this
brief discussion is that the quality of the analysis has been
poor to the extent that it borders, at times, upon disinfor-
mation. This raises the question of how this could occur.
In the following sections I outline evidence of more signif-
icant system failure - the regulation and diffusion of tech-
nology, the fairness of the system and the quality of care.
Relative to their importance these issues have been largely
ignored in the health debate and attracted, at best, a
lethargic policy response. This again raises the question of
how this could occur.
In the remainder of the article it is argued that the answer
to these questions is, in large part, that the health system
has poor governance and has failed to invest adequately in
research and experimentation. This is symptomatic of a
more fundamental problem, namely the near monopoli-
sation of each part of the system by conservative and
defensive government agencies and the belief that defi-
ciencies may be corrected by (occasional) one-off tinker-
ing with the system rather than by the creation of a system
based upon the production and diffusion of evidence,
health services research commensurate with size and
importance of the health sector and upon error learning
rather than error suppression. Some principles for achiev-
ing this are discussed.
Issues of Exaggerated Importance
Private Health Insurance (PHI)
To put PHI in perspective there are two dominating facts.
First, the imperfect evidence available suggests that many
Australians wish to have PHI. National statistics on the
redistributive mechanisms in Australia and the resultant
levels of poverty suggest that Australia is one of the least
egalitarian and the least generous nations in the devel-
oped world (see Table 1 and Additional File 1). Results
from the Monash Health and Ethics Survey [2] reveal
overwhelming support for the proposition that people
Table 1: How Australia compares
The rank order of Australia compared with 18 other OECD* countries: selected statistics
Year Rank No. of countries Australia's ranking
% population in absolute poverty 1995 10 = highest 10 10
Social security transfer (% GDP) 1990-1999 17 = lowest 17 17
% elderly in poverty Late 1990s 16 = highest 16 16
Income of elderly (above 65). ÷ Income 18-64 Mid 1990s 16 = lowest 16 16
Income at 90th/income at 10th percentile Late 1990s 17 = highest inequality 17 13
% population with income below 50% of median income Late 1990s 16 = highest 16 15
% children in poverty
- single mother
- two parents
mid 1990s 15 = highest
15 = highest
15
15
13
13
Official Aid/GDP 2000 18 = lowest 18 15
Total tax/GDP (%) 2000 1 = highest tax 18 15
* All OECD countries with a population above 3 million
Source: [42]Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2009, 6:27 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/6/1/27
Page 3 of 17
(page number not for citation purposes)
should be allowed to spend additional monies on their
own health. Many Australians like to jump queues and
support multi-tier access to health services.
The second dominating fact is that, in terms of its impor-
tance for the sustainability of the health sector, PHI is
quantitatively trivial. In 2007/08 it raised $7.86 billion of
the total national health expenditure of $103.56 billion or
about 7.6 percent. Even in the hospital sector where its
funds are concentrated, it raised only 11 percent of reve-
nues [3]. The highly publicised statistic that PHI under-
pins private hospitals which, in turn, carry out over 50
percent of elective surgery is one of the many examples of
disinformation, or perhaps more accurately, 'spin', on the
statistics. Health funds and private hospitals are the land-
lords providing beds and equipment. The Government,
not PHI, provides the overwhelming proportion of the
insurance against the medical costs in these hospitals.
It would be feasible (as distinct from necessarily desira-
ble), for private hospitals to be nationalised overnight
with 57 percent of their contribution to hospitals being
met from the government subsidy to premiums and the
remaining revenues raised by PHI met by an approximate
1.1 percent increase in taxation. This would not be an eco-
nomic cost to the nation but a redistribution from non
contributors to PHI to those who are currently members.
This course of action is neither advocated nor criticised
here. The key point is that, financially, PHI is an inessen-
tial part of the health sector. The Australian health scheme
cannot be held to ransom by the self evidently false claim
that it depends upon PHI.
Finally, it is difficult to even measure the underlying sup-
port for PHI as the measures taken to support it have dis-
torted the relationship between preferences for PHI and
purchasing decisions. Legislation in the last decade has
driven Australians into PHI with policies which deserve to
be enshrined in the Guinness Book of Records - as the
most bizarre micro-economic policy in a developed coun-
try in the last half century.
The levy on the wealthy who fail to purchase PHI has the
same economic logic as promoting the Australian auto-
mobile industry with a punitive tax surcharge on the
income of wealthy Australians who fail to buy an Austral-
ian car. Lifetime tables are even more perverse. Insurance,
which is usually envisaged as a mechanism for reducing
risks has, by legislation, been forced to increase risk. The
uncertainty associated with illness over the next 20-30
years is clearly much greater than the uncertainty associ-
ated with the next 2 to 3 years. Those making a decision
with a respect to the purchase of insurance are now faced
with greater anxiety and fear because of the longer deci-
sion period, and fear drives people to insurance. An
imperfect analogy would be a policy to increase the
uptake of fire insurance for houses by randomly burning
down houses, increasing people's fear of being a victim
and thereby inducing them to take out fire insurance.
Under these circumstances it is difficult to determine the
underlying demand for (legitimately subsidised) PHI, but
survey results cited above indicate a rejection of the
notion that individuals should not be permitted to spend
more of their own income to receive better access to better
services.
Perversely, the subsidy for those taking PHI which is the
most criticised policy is the most justifiable in terms of
social and normal economic policy. It is justified, how-
ever, not as a device to increase membership per se, or
health care revenue but in terms of (one notion of) equity
to those who are paying more for their health care. This
argument depends upon PHI having no adverse effects
upon others by, for example, diverting a disproportionate
number of doctors from public hospitals). It is untrue, as
some advocates from the public health lobby have argued
that the subsidy is bad economic policy or that the
resources are wasted. Rather, a subsidy is the normal
device for promoting a social policy and resources are
transferred not wasted. But throughout the health care
debate issues of social values are routinely misrepresented
as issues of economic (in) efficiency.
Ageing
The belief that there is a looming crisis because of the age-
ing of the population and booming demands of those
who thoughtlessly chose to be born after 1945 appears to
be a function of bad arithmetic. It reflects the well known
error of reasoning in percentages and disregarding abso-
lute values. Exaggerating somewhat, the percentage of
centurions may well increase by 600 percent in the next 20
years, a frightening prospect until translated into an abso-
lute increase from 100 to 700, a figure too low to have a
detectable impact on health expenditures.
Importantly, and unremarked in reports, a much higher
rate of taxation driven by a much higher growth rate of
health expenditures is consistent with a rising material
standard of living. This may be verified by anyone capable
of calculating compound growth rates. Figure 1 illustrates
the effect of health expenditures rising at twice the rate per
annum as GDP. The bar diagram on the left depicts the
GDP visually as an index of 100 and the proportion of this
devoted to health services. The bar on the right illustrates
the effect upon resource use and availability in 40 years
time if health services grow at 4 percent per annum and
GDP at half this rate. GDP would rise by a factor of 2.208.
Health expenditures would increase from 10 to 22 percent
of this. However, resources left for other expendituresAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2009, 6:27 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/6/1/27
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would increase by 90 percent. This is the simple arithme-
tic result of a larger magnitude (GDP) growing more in
absolute terms than a lesser magnitude (health) despite
rising less in percentage terms. The key message is rela-
tively insensitive to the numbers used in the example; viz,
it is almost inconceivable that rising health expenditures
could significantly contribute to a reduction in the GDP/
capita.
Even the use of GDP/capita as a benchmark is largely a
product of history and intellectual inertia as the available
evidence shows no relationship between GDP/capita and
individual wellbeing [4,5]. Policy, however, appears to be
driven by a fear of changes in the percentage composition
of the GDP. But there is no economic or social reason why
the composition should not change, especially if it
increases wellbeing. Historically, the economy has been
flexible. The agricultural sector, for example has
'imploded' in percentage terms without adverse effects.
The service sector, including health, has expanded to our
advantage (and possibly to the benefit of the environ-
ment).
The Intergenerational Reports and Productivity Commis-
sion have carried out analyses in which the loss of per-
spective results in serious disinformation [6,7]. Figure 2,
taken from the beginning of the 2007 Intergenerational
Report and reproduced widely, encapsulates one of the
The magnitude of health and GDP 2009-2049 Figure 1
The magnitude of health and GDP 2009-2049.
   
  
  
Disinformation: Intergenerational Report 2007, budget deficit as % of GDP Figure 2
Disinformation: Intergenerational Report 2007, budget deficit as % of GDP. Source: [6].Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2009, 6:27 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/6/1/27
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widely cited headline 'messages' from the report. This is
that the budget deficit as a percent of GDP will rise alarm-
ingly to the year 2046-47 and in a way that is directly
attributable to increased health expenditures. The
increased government health expenditures are shown to
exactly match the increased deficit. However the report
does not make clear - at least in its headlines - that its pro-
jections are based upon the assumption that past trends
will continue inflexibly and that taxation is pegged at the
level necessary to support service use in 2007. The Produc-
tivity Commission reaches similar headline conclusions
albeit with qualifications deep in the body of the report.
The National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission
has clearly accepted this message and warns that health
expenditures could so dominate State budgets that there
would be no money left for roads or education [8].
In fact these results are entirely attributable to a set of
assumptions which are tenuous at best and wrong at
worst. In the light of recent macro-economic experience
economic prediction to the year 2046-47 should be
undertaken only in satire. However four points should be
obvious:
1. The economic burden of health spending depends
upon the rate of growth of GDP.
2. Ageing per se in the absence of new health technol-
ogy but with economic growth would have a minimal
effect on the burden of health expenditures. Even with
zero GDP growth and no other changes age driven
expenditure would rise between 1997 and 2051 from
7.5 to 11 percent of GDP [9].
3. Extrapolations are based upon assumptions. In the
present case the effect of ageing has been obtained by
adding technology driven trend health expenditures to
the ageing effect, not by an ageing effect per se. How-
ever, the impact of technology over a longer period of
time is far more difficult to predict than relatively inex-
orable changes in the medium term population struc-
ture.
4. Technologies may be cost enhancing (as at present)
or cost reducing (as with the introduction of antibiot-
ics and possibly products arising from the present bio-
tech revolution). Unlike population, technology can
be regulated in such a way that increased expenditures
should be welcomed if the benefits exceed the costs.
To date the varying rates of population growth across
Europe have been uncorrelated with expenditure growth.
Figure 3 plots the actual growth for each country on the
vertical axis against the rate which would have resulted
from ageing in the absence of any other influence and spe-
cifically technological change. The result indicates that
ageing effects have been absorbed into general expendi-
ture growth. Historically, the inextricable link between
ageing and health expenditures as a percent of GDP
implied by government reports and the press is simply
disinformation.
The final assumption underlying these defective analyses
is that taxation will remain fixed as a percentage of GDP.
Tax rates in Australia are amongst the lowest in the West-
ern World (Table 1) and could rise by 50 to 60 percent
before reaching the levels of countries whose rates of eco-
nomic growth and standards of living have been unaf-
fected by their higher tax rates.
Policy analysis may have been driven by bad arithmetic. A
less benign interpretation is that economic advisors are
presenting data to achieve a covert objective suggested by
bad neoclassical economic theory. There is an arcane
belief in this discipline that additional taxation carries an
'excess burden' for human wellbeing. I have described it as
arcane because there is no empirical evidence for this
belief and the logic behind it is wrong. It assumes that
with less tax people work harder and are thereby better off
(or else why would they have worked harder?) The under-
lying assumption is that the undistorted balance between
work, leisure and all other elements relevant for human
wellbeing is in an optimal state before the distortion of
marginal taxation. The assumptions behind this evidence-
free belief are so absurd they will not be repeated here.
It is worth noting, however, that while the excess burden
'doctrine' teaches that each dollar of tax has a dispropor-
tionate cost, economic theory has not suggested a way of
demonstrating the excess or deficit value of most of the
Government activity funded from these taxes. It is implic-
itly assumed in the GDP accounts that health, education,
law and defence contribute to wellbeing an amount equal
to their dollar cost (and therefore less than the 'cost' of
taxation). Transfer payments to the disadvantaged also do
not generate net benefits but only redistribute them as,
according to orthodox theory, we cannot compare the
utility benefits of one person with another. Transfers may,
however, distort work incentives and, for the same arcane
reason as above this is harmful. Consequently, and with-
out evidence, tax based transfers become a net cost. The
benefits must be treated on a dollar for dollar basis; the
taxes inflict more than a dollar for dollar cost when taken
and given. This may help explain the clearly prejudicial
attitude of many economists towards taxation. It does not
justify their insinuating policy by stealth.
Hospital Queues
Queues or surpluses are difficult to avoid in the context of
a free service. Despite the understandable concern andAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2009, 6:27 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/6/1/27
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publicity, however, these should not be an important
issue in the long term. Three brief comments are relevant
here.
1. It is illustrative of one of the themes of this paper
that policy options which are known, in principle,
cannot be put into action with any confidence because
of the inadequate research into hospital and medical
behaviour, the inadequacy of information systems,
the lack of experimentation and the avoidance of sys-
tem reforms designed to optimise the use of acute hos-
pitals.
A partial solution to the problem, emphasised by gov-
ernment, is to increase hospital efficiency. Hospital
information systems, financial incentives and other
internal reforms have a role to play of course. Hospital
pressures can also be reduced by rational step down
and step up policies, from expanded primary health
care and other low intensity facilities in conjunction
with appropriate admission and discharge policies.
But system reforms and poor governance structures
have inhibited experimentation and discouraged
development of these.
In the long term, however, queuing has little or noth-
ing to do with hospital efficiency. It is the outcome of
the balance between supply and demand. There is, in
principle, near universal agreement that realised
demand should reflect acceptable access to Medicare
and admission for prescribed needs. Ultimately queu-
ing can only be altered by changing one of these vari-
ables: that is, queuing must ultimately be regulated by
changing effective access or supply and the latter can
be set at a level which will create or remove unaccept-
able queues with or without hospital and system effi-
ciency. There has been no long term research, to the
author's knowledge, to determine the level of accepta-
ble supply and access. Policy rhetoric emphasises
deflectionary, albeit, important issues of efficiency.
2. However Australian Governments appear to be pri-
marily concerned with eliminating monetary and not
true economic inefficiency. Extremely accurate budg-
etary data are collected. Virtually no data exist relating
to the inefficiency inflicted upon patients in the form
of suffering and disruption to their lives (as noted
above). Similarly there has been minimal real interest
in equity, evidenced by the fact that the public has not
Change in health expenditures compared with the change in age/sex predicted expenditures, 1960-95 (21 OCED countries) Figure 3
Change in health expenditures compared with the change in age/sex predicted expenditures, 1960-95 (21 
OCED countries). Source: [9].Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2009, 6:27 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/6/1/27
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been properly consulted. Recent research at the CHE
[10] clearly demonstrates that, in the health sector at
least, there is an overwhelming concern with fairness
and sharing and relatively little interest in monetary
efficiency, even when this is expressed in terms of
maximising the number of life years gained from a
budget. Indeed, the research indicates that the general
community would sacrifice 1/3 of life years which
could be allocated to people in order to achieve equi-
table sharing. This strongly suggests that the policy of
minimising expenditure - extracting an annual pro-
ductivity bonus and 'letting health departments cope'
- strongly conflicts with the preferences of the popula-
tion. 'Inefficiency' in the form of greater tax financed
expenditure would clearly be preferred to the inequity
of non treatment. In view of the evidence that there is
no change in subjective wellbeing as GDP rises, [4,11]
policies involving increased taxes and spending in
areas of demonstrated public concern should be wel-
comed.
3. The past government's most publicised solution to
queuing - incentives for individuals to purchase PHI
and private hospital care to 'take pressure off public
hospitals' was, at best, evidence free avoidance of the
problem, but more consistent with a policy of appeas-
ing the interests associate with PHI. It has been known
for at least a decade that queuing has been associated
with supply side constraints, not uncontrollable
demand. This is exacerbated, not ameliorated, by the
transfer of medical staff to private hospital facilities
where they are likely to provide more, not less, inten-
sive servicing for the same condition promoted by fee
for service and PHI [12-14]. The ability of government
to base its policy for so long upon public disinforma-
tion attests the lamentable state of public and journal-
istic understanding of even the simplest relationships
in the health sector and the relevant magnitudes.
Relatively Neglected Issues
Technologies
New technology has been the great driver of human wel-
fare generally and new technologies have dominated and
will continue to dominate both the costs and the benefits
of health services. While face to face consultations per cap-
ita fell 6 percent in the 12 years to 2007/08 diagnostic and
procedural services rose by 62 and 32 percent per person
respectively and the overnight separation rate per 1,000
for acute services rose to a level 27 percent above the rate
in the USA, 20 percent above the rate in the older UK pop-
ulation and 66.7 percent above the rate in the comparable
Canadian population [15]. Lack of research prevents us
from judging whether these large magnitude differences
indicate a strength or a weakness in the Australian system.
Despite this, lamentably small attention is given to health
technologies at the level of health service diffusion and
delivery. While Australia pioneered the economic evalua-
tion of drugs, and the use of products and devices, and
technologies must be approved by the TGA, the overall
research effort in this area is dispersed, uncoordinated and
reactive and appears to have little error learning capacity.
There is insufficient national capacity to evaluate old ther-
apies retrospectively or to monitor outcomes. The data for
this is collected, but is not used.
Long term, there is an urgent need to install the capacity
to proactively seek new technologies and to ensure (or
block) their diffusion and use as quickly as possible. To
fail to do so is to reduce population health. But the issue
has never been on the political radar.
Equity
Medibank and Medicare were established to achieve equi-
table access to hospital and medical services. They
achieved this in one respect only, namely the extension of
financial insurance to the 15 percent of the population
who had not purchased it privately prior to Medibank.
Apart from this small (albeit important) improvement the
achievement of equity has remained very largely at the
rhetorical level. Using the first universal database from
Medibank Richardson and Deeble found that the use of
both GP's and Specialists in Sydney in 1976 were both
(coincidentally) 4.6 times greater than in Darwin after
adjusting for age and sex. Discrepancies between statisti-
cal divisions were much greater [16]. Studies by the author
25 years later found similar discrepancies in the use of
procedures across Victoria and huge differences in the use
of new technologies in the public and private sectors
[17,18].
The response to the obvious inequities between urban
and rural areas in Australia may best be described as 'dab
policies'. There has been little serious attempt to equalise
access. The issue, however, has not been near the top of
the public agenda and possibly because information
about inequities is not routinely documented and distrib-
uted throughout the community. Indeed, from the
author's experience, it is possible that the non provision
of information which has reinforced this complacency
may have been promoted by public authorities (see Addi-
tional file 2).
Another dimension of inequity relates to the adequacy of
insurance coverage by type of medical service. As shown
in Table 2, insurance coverage by Medicare is highly
erratic reflecting the historical influence of the profes-
sional groups benefiting from the insurance (default free
funding). Hospital services, the most expensive form of
care, are almost fully insured and consequently, cheapest
to use. Medicines are very poorly insured despite the factAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2009, 6:27 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/6/1/27
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that the longevity of Australians is probably attributable,
in large part to the widespread availability and use of anti-
hypertensive drugs. But for many people at risk of CVD
these are 'outside Medicare' - there is no subsidy. For
example, with an average price to patients of $15.11 per
script in 2009 [19] people without a health care card
would pay the full price of the antihypertensive drug Aten-
oll, the sixth largest volume PBS drug dispensed and those
with a card face a 30 percent copayment which, evidence
suggests, will impact disproportionately upon low indi-
vidual incomes as there is no immediate symptom relief
[20]. Possibly the most cost effective therapy in the health
system is effectively excluded from Medicare for the
majority of the population and the disadvantaged pay
large copayments. Of all cardiovascular drugs on the PBS
15.8 percent receive no subsidy and an unknown number
a very low subsidy [19]. There is no stated rationale for
discriminating against the loss of quality of life associated
with vision and teeth. Yet the relevant services are also
largely uninsured.
The apparent (default) explanation is policy inertia, the
failure to review the system; or by an overriding year by
year concern with the government budget. There are no
data to properly document the suffering this causes.
There is no reason why regular reports should not be
made available regarding access to and use of services by
groups differing geographically, socially, racially and by
disease category. The data exist, but are not published.
Data should also exist documenting the needless suffering
which results from the exclusion of services. Explicit com-
parisons of groups would sensitise the community and
possibly force policies that promote equity. It is possible
to surmise that it is precisely for this reason that such
information is not produced.
Quality and Safety
The issue of adverse events in the Australian health system
should dominate all others. However it will be closer to
the truth to describe it as Australia's best kept secret. In
1995 the 'Quality in Australian Health Care' (QAHCS)
study uncovered an appalling iceberg of avoidable adverse
events including large scale unnecessary death. Following
publication, virtually nothing effective occurred on a scale
commensurate with the problem. Ten years later an edito-
rial in the MJA reflected upon this as follows:
'Based on QAHCS outcomes 25 patients die each day
in our hospitals from preventable adverse events... we
have had report after report... we still have no nation-
ally accepted framework for clinical governance to
assure the safety and quality of Australian health serv-
ices... This ongoing vacuum is an indictment of our
Health Ministers and organised medicine' [21].
It appears that following publication the Health Minister
of the day accepted the report as being methodologically
sound and of great importance. However the representa-
tives of organised medicine pronounced it, without evi-
dence, to be incorrect. Following a change in Government
shortly thereafter, the new Health Minister accepted this
evidence free conclusion. The study was not repeated to
determine validity nor was there an urgent review of safety
but simply a series of reports. The cumulative effect of
these was summed up, somewhat despairingly in 2006, by
the persons initially placed in charge of the reform process
in the following way:
'One might assume that systematic improvements
within the health system are either happening or, at
least, well advanced. Regrettable, improvements are
still patchy. The greatest challenge for all remains how
to achieve universal and systematic changes to the
health system within a federated system' [22].
In 2009, the 'Report to Support Australia's First (sic)
National Primary Health Care Strategy noted that 'there is
currently very little information about the quality of care
provided in primary health care... the (US based) Com-
monwealth Fund survey... found (20 percent) of patients
reported experiencing a medical, medicinal or laboratory
error [23]. By the end of 2009 it was possible for Healy
and Dugdale [24] to write 'realisation is dawning that
medical errors are common events' - more than one and a
half decades after results from QAHCS became available.
The term 'adverse event' is referred to in only four para-
graphs of the National Health and Hospitals Reform
Commission final report.
Table 2: Patient out-of-pocket payments 2005/06
% of cost
Hospital 2.2
Medical 11.3
Dental 67.9
Medicines 45.9
Aids/Appliances 74.1
Total 17.7
Source: [3]Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2009, 6:27 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/6/1/27
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The size of the problem which has been ignored is simply
astonishing. If the death rates estimated by the QAHCS
are correct then the number of Australians unnecessarily
dying is approximately equivalent to a jumbo jet crashing
every 2 weeks each resulting in the deaths of 350 Austral-
ians. Alternatively, it is equivalent to a repetition of the
Bali bombing every 4 days. The cumulative unnecessary
deaths since the publication of the QAHCS report would
exceed the number of Australians killed in World War 1.
We can only speculate on the reasons why Australian
authorities have failed in their most fundamental duty of
protecting the lives of their citizens. One possibility is that
the magnitudes involved are simply too large for people
to believe. (Indeed, it may even seem a little shrill to men-
tion such melodramatic facts!) Human beings form clear
expectations concerning the way in which the world they
experience operates. As John Maynard Keynes famously
commented in the last paragraph of his 'General Theory',
after the age of 26-30 most find it very difficult to change
these patterns. Australians, their politicians and the med-
ical profession have so long regarded the health system as
being safe and amongst the best in the world that results
from the QAHCS may simply have been dismissed as
absurd, ie conflicting too radically with established pat-
terns of belief. The authorities who endorse or bury such
research are well beyond the age of 30. The author's per-
sonal experience in attempting to publicise this report is
consistent with this hypothesis (see Additional file 3).
Nevertheless a prudent government would have repeated
the study to disconfirm it.
An alternative explanation is that policy makers, like oth-
ers, are more responsive to sensational media reports than
correctly collected evidence. Cynically, they may only be
concerned with the lives of Australians that have been
identified and politicised by the press. More probably,
however, individuals in governments and bureaucracies
(like others) are likely to have focussed only upon their
defined area of responsibility and our governance struc-
tures have not assigned responsibility for this situation to
anyone and lack the flexibility to error learn and act deci-
sively, at least in the health sector.
The National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission
did acknowledge the existence of adverse events in muted
terms and, chillingly, stated that there is a need for 'culture
change'. This same phrase was used over a decade earlier
and appears to be code for 'postpone the problem for a
generation/leave it to the medical profession, to put their
house in order - as they failed to do in the 20th Century'.
Discussion
Principles for dynamic adaptation
A common feature of recommended reforms has been
what might be described as 'static optimality': A series of
one-off recommendations are made for the achievement
of the optimal health system. The author has contributed
to this literature [14]. Many of the principles suggested
are, of course, sound (particularly in the latter reference!)
In the optimal system there would be a single purchaser of
all services for defined populations. The present irrational,
geographic, service-based and disease-based boundaries
would be eliminated. Many or possibly all of the perform-
ance indicators listed in the NHHRC's April Report would
be initially adopted [25].
Below I focus upon a dimension of reform which is sel-
dom considered but, in the light of the previous discus-
sion, would appear to be of greatest importance. The focus
is a response to repeated failures; the failure to adequately
respond to information when it is available - adverse
events and, evolving technologies; failure to investigate or
address issues of stated importance - inequity; failure to
seek out the nature of health system related social objec-
tives; failure to match policy priorities with the magnitude
of the problem and failure to invest in the system naviga-
tion equipment necessary for planning the future and
responding flexibly to error.
Repeating an earlier theme, the economic (and other) his-
tory of the 20th Century has been dominated by technol-
ogy, innovation and uncertainty - elements for which
economics has failed to provide either explanation or
guidance. This is reflected in the health economics debate
over optimal health systems which, apart from innovation
of the moment, have largely ignored the implications of
these three dominating themes for system reform. While
market capitalism self evidently requires regulation and
the market model is manifestly unsuitable for the health
sector, the history of capitalism in the 20th Century pro-
vides one important insight. The market provides a flexi-
ble, adaptive and creative mechanism for allocating
resources. The experience of the last 100 years, reviewed
comprehensively by Beinhocker [26], suggests the follow-
ing principles:
• Monopolies, however creative initially, have gener-
ally evolved into conservative organisations which
commonly fail, a point clearly articulated by Prime
Minister Kevin Rudd, in the context of homeland secu-
rity, when he endorsed the view that 'big departments
risk becoming less accountable, less agile, less adapta-
ble and more inward looking' [27].
￿ Corporations which do not 'reinvent themselves'
regularly have a limited life time. Most firms fail afterAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2009, 6:27 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/6/1/27
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a period of initial creativity and success. The US auto-
mobile industry is a dramatic example;
￿ The engine of progress is often small, innovative
enterprise with an idea which has not or cannot be
implemented by the larger monopoly/corporation.
(The most spectacular recent example is Microsoft's
takeover from IBM of the market for desktop comput-
ing);
￿ Growing bureaucracy and overemphasis on due
processes are often the reasons why larger 'non-rein-
venting' corporations loose the innovative advantage
(a generalisation again illustrated by the history of
Microsoft and IBM); and
￿ Organisations which have survived, innovated and
'reinvented themselves', have invested heavily in tech-
nology and market research - their industrial 'naviga-
tion equipment'.
The reform of the Australian health system should be
informed by this experience. The reform process should
be driven to a significant extent, by the need to achieve
dynamic adaptability through time and, in particular, by
error learning. None of the reform proposals of which the
author is aware, including those of the NHHRC, have
emphasised this need. The 'buzz words' are scattered lib-
erally throughout rhetorical passages, but proposals do
not show how these translate into policy. Uniquely, the
advantages of dynamic adaptability are implicit in the
Scotton-Enthoven proposals for Managed Competition
although, as elsewhere, Scotton emphasises the static
properties of the model [28,29].
The experience summarised above suggests that the fol-
lowing principles should be considered in the reconstruc-
tion of the health system, in addition to the principles for
static optimality.
1. No part of the Australian health system including
the funding of research should be subject to monop-
oly control. The simplest way of achieving this is to
base an integrated health system upon a sub-national
unit, either the state health regions or, possibly, fund-
holding unit as envisaged in the model of Managed
Competition. These units should have a significant
degree of autonomy in the way in which they allocate
resources. As in the market, diversity maximises the
chance of successful innovation and improvement.
The counterargument that differences imply inequity
is simply hypocritical. There has been no sustained
concern with equity and, as evidenced by their support
for PHI, Australians are not particularly interested in
the reality of equality. More substantively, when suc-
cessful elements of a sub-national health system are
identified by a national authority they can be man-
dated for the other health systems. It is doubtful that
many would openly defend the structural pretence of
equity for the reality of better health especially as both
goals can be currently improved.
In this context Canada's leading health economist Bob
Evans comments that:
'A particularly interesting feature of the Spanish (expe-
rience) is the way in which devolution of political
authority to sub-national governments served - against
conventional wisdom - to open a democratic window,
advancing and securing the universal system in the
face of ambivalence (at best) at the national level.
(Canada provides a similar example)' [30].
2. Innovation should be 'ongoing' not simply the 'dab
innovation' which characterises the present manage-
ment, but should involve significant and sustained
experimentation. As in every other industry this costs
money. The expectation that the Coordinated Care
Trials commenced in 1995 - by Australian standards,
more a 'splash' than a 'dab' - would achieve rapid cost
saving without the outlay of significant expenditures
was as naive as the expectation by a manufacturer that
a new and profitable mode of production might
evolve without any venture capital.
3. Innovation should be informed by the careful
observation of success overseas, something which has
seldom occurred in Australia (the chief exception
being the imitation of elements of Canadian Medicare
by Medibank in 1994). Despite evidence for over 30
years that the US Kaiser Permanente Corporation has
operated highly successful, cost effective, integrated
clinics and more recent evidence from the reform of
the Veterans Health Service there has been no attempt
to seriously study or experiment with their experience.
New Zealand's innovations have likewise been
ignored. The inward looking nature of Australian pol-
icy is epitomised by the failure of the PBAC to look at
the international market price of drugs when negotiat-
ing with pharmaceutical companies and this has
resulted in examples of extraordinary over payment
[31]. This is as irrational as a corporation negotiating
in a market in terms of the data provided to it by an
interested party and ignoring the known prices else-
where in the market.
4. The above principles cannot be implemented with-
out investment in 'industry navigation equipment'. It
is likely that no other industry in Australia spends asAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2009, 6:27 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/6/1/27
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little, proportionately, on the marketing, delivery and
adaption of their product to customer (social) needs
as occurs in the health sector despite the fact that the
industry is almost certainly the most complex and
important for future wellbeing. The fact that this
appears to be true in other countries does not lessen
the consequences of this. There has been a failure to
invest in health services research on anything much
more than a symbolic level and then without serious
strategy or plan. While having one of the best data sys-
tems in the world, it is largely unused in terms of its
real potential for management and evaluation.
Research is largely conducted on an ad hoc, or 'on
demand' basis, by health departments for specific pur-
poses and commonly results in confidential reports.
There is a dearth of creative ideas flowing through to
the level of creative planning.
The last serious proposal for comprehensive, coherent
reform - the Scotton plan - died at least in part because
of the failure to create a new generation of health
economists capable of developing such or similar
plans and carrying out the prerequisite technical anal-
ysis as has been ongoing in the USA, the Netherlands
and elsewhere. Perhaps with the wisdom of hindsight
it is likely that the existence of serious navigation
equipment in the field of new technology would have
suggested such extreme uncertainty with respect to
workforce requirements that a much greater emphasis
would have been given to the training of a flexible
workforce capable of varying its level of performance
in accordance with the emergence of new technology
driven needs.
5. Since the introduction of Medicare in 1994 there
has been bipartisan political support for the disregard
of serious and well publicised deficiencies in the gov-
ernance of the health sector as well as those discussed
above (Additional file 4). The hypothesis which
appears best able to explain this is that at the govern-
ment level an increasingly important principle is to
not create problems for government through reforms
which will result in organised opposition from power-
ful interest groups and only benefit those (the public)
who are largely unaware of the benefits that they
might receive. If this hypothesis is correct and likely to
characterise future political motivation, then an
important governance principle is to establish a long
term structure which is one stage removed from gov-
ernment with government only responsible for broad
policy and funding. The most concerted but largely
unsuccessful attempt to significantly improve coordi-
nation within the present system was made by the
Hospital and Health Services Commission, HHSC,
(1973-1976) along with a number of other suggested
innovations. Significantly, as discussed later, this
group was statutorily independent from government.
Governance Principles
One example of the allocation of responsibilities based
upon (but differing in emphasis from) a modified Scotton
model which satisfies many of these requirements is sum-
marised below along with a broad implementation time-
table [28,29]. (It is contrasted with Medicare Select later.)
De-politicising health
Semi-autonomous commissions should be established at
either the State or regional levels responsible for the pur-
chase of all hospital and ambulatory including dental and
ophthalmological services. The commission should be
directed by a board including representatives of the Com-
monwealth, State and major providers of services and be
able to innovate in both the form of purchasing and the
physical organisation of delivery.
The reform process
This should be driven by an independent commission
which might itself evolve into a statutorily independent
body, analogous to the Reserve Bank, for the permanent
over-viewing of the health system. The body should not
be dominated by 'insiders': health professionals, mem-
bers of the government health bureaucracy or persons
associated with government. (It is too easy for a culture to
develop in which common but contestable assumptions
become universally accepted. Paraphrasing Donald
Rumsfeld, in the Health Sector 'stuff happens' (cf adverse
events); needed change will be implemented by the
responsible department and so on.) The Commission's
charter, but not its operation, should, of course, be deter-
mined politically (see BCA submission to the NHHRC
[32]). Like the Reserve Bank it should have very significant
research capacity, for example, incorporating an institute
as described below.
Regulation and monitoring
The Commonwealth should mandate a minimum pack-
age of services and monitor access to these services with
penalties for violation of the principles. However there
should be capacity for difference and experimentation.
Funding
Pooled government revenues should be based upon a pre-
determined formula with shares unrelated to any element
of delivery. The needs adjusted per capita allocation to the
purchasing authority, determined by the Commonwealth,
should be phased in to replace the status quo. The for-
mula determining the government shares of the funding is
irrelevant for system performance.Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2009, 6:27 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/6/1/27
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Service provision
Initially, as at present, States should run State hospitals
and the private sector run medical, dental, other ambula-
tory and pharmaceutical services. The Commonwealth
should be responsible for negotiating certain prices such
as pharmaceuticals and the rebate for fee for service med-
ical services because of the lack of market power by sub-
national units.
Private Health Insurance
This should initially be unchanged except for the removal
of the surcharge and phasing out of life time tables (effi-
ciency measures). The subsidy should initially be main-
tained. However research is needed to determine the true
effect of PHI on the availability of health services to Medi-
care patients and the size of the subsidy should be deter-
mined in the light of this and further research into
population preferences with respect to a multi-tier health
system.
Navigation Equipment
At least one, and on the principle of non-monopoly, pref-
erably more statutorily independent institutes should be
created similar to but independent from the AIHW. They
should have the following functions:
Quality monitoring and assurance
The institute should have powers to acquire and require
information and to conduct onsite investigation. It
should be required to carry out ongoing international col-
lation of techniques for quality assurance and to translate
these techniques into a form compatible with the Austral-
ian system.
Information diffusion
Comprehensive data provision on issues of access and
equity, including hospital specific queues by procedure
should be made available on the web.
Technology and innovation
The institute should proactively seek out new technolo-
gies (preferably in conjunction with the relevant medical
colleges) and refer them to the relevant technology assess-
ment group for possible inclusion in Medicare.
Results of routine health services research and statutorily
determined information should be regularly provided to
the public regarding the level of disaggregated service use
and the (standardised) quality of different provider
groups.
Ideas for innovation
The institute should monitor 'good ideas' which have suc-
ceeded in other countries and proactively provide these to
appropriate bodies throughout the health system.
Ad hoc research
It is highly desirable that issues of current public or polit-
ical interest should be satisfactorily researched and not be
the subject of disinformation and unsubstantiated spin.
The institute should have a capacity to conduct research
on the request of a Minister and on its own initiative. It
should have the task of proactively providing relevant
information to members of the media who are perceived
to be providing factually incorrect information to the pub-
lic.
Blue sky research
There should be a capacity to either conduct or promote
additional research of a more long term or exploratory
nature.
HSR workforce
The institute should be responsible for monitoring and
recommending measures to ensure a satisfactory health
service research workforce. With current 'dab' funding of
HSR there is no career path for health economics and
unsurprisingly an almost complete dearth of research into
health systems. Part of an institute's function should be
the training of such a workforce via cadetships in its
research divisions in conjunction with relevant university
and government departments.
Data
The institute should have a statutory right to all relevant
administrative and other data collected by the AIHW but
also data which is not collected by the AIHW such as that
monopolised by the current Commonwealth Department
of Health and Ageing.
In 1973 the Whitlam government created an institute sim-
ilar to the one described here. The Hospital and Health
Services Commission (H&HSC) was statutorily independ-
ent and had the ability to analyse, plan, publish, intro-
duce research and recommend policy. It initiated a data
based approach to policy development which resulted in
the establishment of the Community Health Program
which included programs for family medicine, hospital
development and initiatives with respect to diagnostic
and rehabilitation services, Aboriginal and rural health,
health transportation, Aboriginal and rural health and the
health workforce [33]. It differed from the present pro-
posal in two important respects. First, it relied upon exist-
ing institutions to obtain data. Secondly, it was largely
concerned with the formulation and recommendation of
policy.
These differences may have proved lethal for its longevity
as the Commission was disbanded with the change of
government in November 1975 [34]. It is for this reason
that the present suggestion is for an institute which cannotAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2009, 6:27 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/6/1/27
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be seen as political through its advocacy of policies which
may become or already have become politically aligned.
Since Australia spends about $100,000 million on health
services there is, however, a strong case for (at least) two
institutes: one concerned with information and its dis-
semination and one with options formulation and advo-
cacy along the lines of the H&HSC.
Timetable
With the exception of the creation of one or more insti-
tutes for health services research and evaluation most of
the suggested functions, or variants of them, could be
achieved relatively quickly as they involve governance and
financial flows rather than the creation of new physical
infrastructure. Initially the public would feel little effect.
Subsequently, the form of delivery might change substan-
tially as the area based commissions responsible for pur-
chasing services experimented with new methods of
delivery (such as Kaiser-like clinics for integrated care). An
additional option would be a movement towards Man-
aged Competition as private health funds or other groups
negotiated a 'carve out' for a voluntary group. Such a task
would involve research into the determination of risk
related premiums and likely effects upon cost and equity.
(Recent evidence from the Netherland's experiment with
Managed Competition suggests that this option might
result in inequalities unacceptable even to the unegalitar-
ian Australian public.) Evans [30] notes that from 1995 to
2002 fund specific extra premiums (above needs-based
capitation payments) rose from 3 percent to over 50 per-
cent suggesting significant quality differences between
schemes. This again illustrates the need for reform based
upon careful research and modelling of the impact of dif-
ferent regulatory structures. An indicative timetable is
reproduced in Additional file 5.
The National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission 
(NHHRC)
In 2009 several major reports were presented to the gov-
ernment. First, a report to Support Australia's First
National Primary Health Care Policy conducted a detailed
review of issues and options for the reform of Primary
Health Care (PHC). The focus of this and the accompany-
ing draft report was primary services delivered by GPs,
nurses, allied health providers, Aboriginal health practi-
tioners and pharmacists. Consistent with the problems
identified in this paper the key elements included access,
coordination, safety and information [23,35].
Next, in an impressive, evidence based report the National
Preventative Health Taskforce released its strategy docu-
ment recommending policies which would, without
doubt alter the unhealthy trajectory of Australian society
[36]. It is almost certainly correct in its assessment that
these policies could prevent 'hundreds of thousands of
Australians dying prematurely or falling ill and suffering
between now and 2020'. But the barriers to these policies
are even larger than those which have blocked serious
health sector reform, albeit being of the same political ori-
gin.
In the context of health sector reform, the most significant
document was the final report of the National Health and
Hospital Reform Commission (NHHRC) 'A Healthier
Future for all Australians' [37]. The report is structurally
elegant. It focuses upon health and its achievement in a
social context as distinct from the services and financial
flows which dominate most proposals for system reform.
The report is structured according to important and piv-
otal principles - connecting care, care at different life
stages, rural, mental health etc, inequalities and quality.
However, none of the resulting sub-principles, excellent
though many of them may be, are likely to become
embedded in the system unless the governance structure
determining regulation and incentives is appropriate and
in this respect the report is deeply disappointing. Its dis-
cussion of governance is almost completely absent. In one
of the second round submissions Andrew Podger notes
that:
'Governance is important. It is not a separate issue
from practical measures aimed to improve service
delivery and health outcomes. It is the means by
which the Australian community can be sure that the
health system is delivering what it is there for. Moreo-
ver, current governance arrangements are contributing
directly to current weaknesses in the quality, effective-
ness and efficiency of the Australian health system.'
[38]
The Commission's response was to use this quotation to
head Chapter 6 and then provide less argument for their
recommendations with respect to governance than in the
interim report where it represented one page for each of
three options under review.
The focus of the Commission's report also has no overlap
with the areas of concern discussed in this paper. This is
unsurprising. The present paper highlights errors and fail-
ures and then sketches a governance system based upon
the principle of error learning. The NHHRC, while noting
most of the relevant issues somewhere, does not seriously
analyse past failures. It never considers the question why
major problems and reforms, known and needed for dec-
ades, have been ignored and what structural changes are
necessary to guard against a perpetuation of this problem.
As with all other proposals Australians would depend
upon the wisdom and benevolence of monopoly bureau-Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2009, 6:27 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/6/1/27
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crats for the monitoring and implementation of reform;
that is error learning and dynamic adaptation would
depend upon the same flawed mechanism as at present,
namely a department largely driven by short term minis-
terial concerns and with significant monopoly control
over information, research, venture capital and with pow-
erful personal and institutional incentives for the suppres-
sion of the information which drives reform, namely
information concerning failures and errors.
This casts some doubt upon the wisdom of the structure
of the report. Because 'connecting care', care at different
life stages, etc are important, it does not follow that they
should have determined the structure of the report. Anal-
ogously, while the quality of life, not radiotherapy, may
be the endpoint of cancer services, a report into these serv-
ices should not necessarily make quality of life the struc-
tural focus if the core problem is an absence of
radiotherapy services. The report should focus upon the
cause, not consequences of the problem. The integrity of
the report depends upon a correct diagnosis of the core
problem and not a description, however accurate, of the
downstream problems arising from them.
The NHHRC documents so many - probably correct -
downstream problems or potential improvements and so
many elements of the current system are acknowledged as
sub-optimal that perspective on the problems is easily
lost; and it appears to be lost in the report. For example,
in the draft report, the Quality of Australian Health Care
Study (QAHCS), discussed earlier, is viewed as evidence
that 'admission to hospital is not without risk' (p 133).
This is analogous to acknowledging that 'the Sahara
Desert has dry bits'. An alternative perspective is that the
QAHCS revealed the greatest non-military, avoidable
calamity in Australia's history and that in another context
- say, product safety or occupational health and safety -
the subsequent disregard of evidence of widespread death
and injury would have led to criminal prosecution. But
the potential lessons of this astonishing episode of Aus-
tralia's health history are lost in a sea of largely unfocused
detail. In the final report it is simply noted that adverse
events can 'cause harm to a person receiving health care...
such events cause patients distress and suffering, (and)
compromise operational efficiency...' (p 55).
The chief lesson which should have been learned from the
QAHCS and the other failures documented here is that
government answerable departments - increasingly dedi-
cated to the short term ministerial task of appeasing polit-
ically effective groups - are capable of major failures and
are increasingly questionable bodies for the short, or even
medium term, direction of the health system. There is a
need for the separation of policy and system monitoring
on the one hand, from implementation and innovation
on the other.
The role of government, more generally, has been the sin-
gle largest theme in the discipline of economics since
Adam Smith highlighted its potential shortcomings, and
the largest single theme in the economic health policy
debate since the introduction of the UK NHS. However
there is no echo of this in the NHHRC report. Australian
government and governance are implicitly unproblemati-
cal, dynamic and wise. The problems discussed by Donald
Horne in the 'Lucky Country' have dissolved with time
[39].
In the governance structure outlined earlier in this paper
the answer to the question 'who guards the guardian' is
firstly the Commonwealth regulatory bodies and, sec-
ondly, a statutorily independent body which, like the
Reserve Bank, has supervisory and regulatory power but
no direct responsibility for service delivery. In the Com-
mission's governance structure there is no guardian of the
Commonwealth authorities except the Minister and Par-
liament and it is their impotence on large scale reform
which has been the chief problem to date.
The needed governance structure should pre-commit gov-
ernment to certain courses of action and ease the political
pain of desirable policy. Analogously, the Reserve Bank
may increase interest rates despite short term popular
opposition.
These considerations suggest that the NHHRC's chief rec-
ommendations with respect to governance are seriously
wrong. After a transitionary phase of hospital cost sharing
(once believed to be inflationary) they would enshrine a
Commonwealth monopoly. The depth of analysis sup-
porting this recommendation in the report, however, is
simply lamentable. It argues that '... we heard from many
consumers and health professionals - a desire for one
health system' (p 147). But the problem documented in
Additional file 4 here is the lack of coordination arising
from multiple funding sources for the services available to
any one individual - integration of primary health and
hospital care, step down facilities, etc. This implies the
need for a single fund holder for an individual not a single
fund holder for all Australia. The case against diversity and
experimentation in PHC is simply asserted, 'Our recom-
mendations for ... a transformed comprehensive primary
health care platform ...require one government - the Com-
monwealth Government - to be responsible -... thus we
recommend that the Commonwealth Government
assumes full responsibility for Primary Health Care Serv-
ices' (p 148). The argument for economies of scale is
untrue and the difficulty tracking border crossing over-
looks developments in data processing technology in theAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2009, 6:27 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/6/1/27
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last few decades. The Commission argues against regional
health authorities because 'there are dangers of 'balkonis-
ing' health services, with people's access to care deter-
mined by the region they live in' (p 154). The
Commissioners do not use irony elsewhere in the report.
In the context of these proposals there is no discussion of
regulatory or system incentives for innovation. Almost as
an afterthought, however, the Commission does appear to
recognise some of the problems inherent in a monopoly
and recommends 'Medicare Select' as a longer term gov-
ernance model. This is a less developed version of Man-
aged Competition than the model advocated by Scotton
[40]. It represents an almost complete negation of the
arguments for a monopoly. Concern with 'cost and
bureaucracy' dissolve and 'innovative approaches to fund-
ing' are advocated (p 158). These must equate with
employee contributions (one of the most poisonous ele-
ments of the US system) or private contributions favour-
ing the wealthy and copayments (disadvantaging the
poor). The concerns discussed above are not mentioned.
As 'the devil is often in the detail' Scotton never envisaged
his suggestions as being an implementation plan or one
which could be fully evaluated on the basis of his broad
description. There is no devil in the NHHRC option as
there is no detail for it to be in. There is no possibility of
Medicare Select being endorsed, as proposed, and its only
contribution to the report is that it allows the Commis-
sion to encourage the government to reconsider govern-
ance.
Conclusion
Andrew Podger reports that in his capacity of Secretary to
the Health Minister, he would suggest a major review of
the health system 'almost every other year'. He (the Min-
ister) would respond that articulating clearly the long
term direction was as dangerous as "'big bang" reform'
[41].
The goal of evidence based policy at the system level
appears as far away today as evidence based medicine in
the 19th Century and the quotation above indicates a fun-
damental reason for this. It suggests an obvious conclu-
sion. While elements of the ideal health system are
necessarily political - for example the right of people to
buy better access to better quality care - measures should
be taken which de-politicise reform or at least reduce the
political cost of it. The suggestion here is that this be
achieved by the dissemination of accurate information
about current performance and future options and by the
implementation and regulation of policy by de-politicised
bodies.
The relative self satisfaction with the Australian system
largely arises from a widespread ignorance of the issues
discussed here and possibly from crediting the good
health of Australians to the institutional and governance
arrangements which emerged historically as a result of
self-interest, pragmatism and genuine idealism and which
are now described, misleadingly, as 'a system'. The exist-
ence of similar problems in other countries does not rep-
resent evidence of Australia's success but, more probably,
of similar histories of defective governance. Bad ideas and
bad practices have also been globalised and health system
planning and reform has commonly been delegated to
interested parties, namely the medical profession, which
is generally untrained in system science, and public health
bureaucracies steeped in the immovable imperatives of
the status quo. However the good health of most Austral-
ians cannot justify system satisfaction as its cause is not
well understood (deficient research) and as suggested ear-
lier, is probably more attributable to the widespread use
of a limited number of effective therapies and effective
public health measures than to the (dis)organisation of
curative services.
By design and not by default, reform has been incremental
where the increments have been tiny, timid and some-
times backwards (eg PHI legislation). While it is true that
we are, in large part, prisoners of history this perspective
can be overstated and the consequences of this rationali-
sation of inertia extremely deleterious to the wellbeing of
the population. There can be little doubt that major prob-
lems with the system have simply been ignored and that
this is not attributable to history but to a lack of dyna-
mism, itself attributable in large part to the monopoly
control over serious system reform by a politicised
bureaucracy.
It has been argued here that the approaches to reform
implemented and discussed in Australia have largely
missed these dimensions of the problem. Proposals are
'static'. Once achieved the health system will be optimal.
Wise, centralised bodies will identify and implement
needed change without the need for too much evidence or
ongoing experimentation. This approach is reflected in
the NHHRC report [25]. Recommendations are listed but
they arise from nowhere and in terms of implementation
strategies lead nowhere. It is implicitly assumed that with
the slightly clarified governance structure, which is recom-
mended, we should trust the bureaucracy to achieve these
targets. No broader thinking is revealed in the report. But
historically the bureaucracy has comprehensively failed to
reform important elements of Australia's health system or
even to ensure that the health system is safe. More gener-
ally the NHHRC failed to recognise any of the key themes
discussed here and, in contrast, recommended the rein-
forcement of the single most harmful element in the sys-Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2009, 6:27 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/6/1/27
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tem, the monopolisation of the entire country's health
system by a single body. Belief in the flexibility, benevo-
lence and wisdom of monopolies in either the public or
private sectors simply misses the major lesson of the 20th
Century.
In view of the overwhelming evidence from outside the
health system that progress depends upon the 'reinven-
tion' of organisations from time to time, the final conclu-
sion here is that the health sector, which represents the
most expensive industry in the country - 10 percent of the
national use of its resources - and a major potential source
of future wellbeing, requires a comprehensive, long term
and long overdue review of all aspects of its operation.
This should not be based solely upon the collation of
opinions, however authoritative, and the balancing of
interest groups. It should include a detailed and published
analysis of the system's strengths, weaknesses and oppor-
tunities
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